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Abstract
Performance of the existing physical layer authentication schemes could be severely affected by the
imperfect estimates and variations of the communication link attributes used. The commonly adopted
static hypothesis testing for physical layer authentication faces significant challenges in time-varying
communication channels due to the changing propagation and interference conditions, which are typically
unknown at the design stage. To circumvent this impediment, we propose an adaptive physical layer
authentication scheme based on machine-learning as an intelligent process to learn and utilize the
complex and time-varying environment, and hence to improve the reliability and robustness of physical
layer authentication. Explicitly, a physical layer attribute fusion model based on a kernel machine
is designed for dealing with multiple attributes without requiring the knowledge of their statistical
properties. By modeling the physical layer authentication as a linear system, the proposed technique
directly reduces the authentication scope from a combined N -dimensional feature space to a single-
dimensional (scalar) space, hence leading to reduced authentication complexity. By formulating the
learning (training) objective of the physical layer authentication as a convex problem, an adaptive
algorithm based on kernel least-mean-square is then proposed as an intelligent process to learn and
track the variations of multiple attributes, and therefore to enhance the authentication performance.
Both the convergence and the authentication performance of the proposed intelligent authentication
process are theoretically analyzed. Our simulations demonstrate that our solution significantly improves
the authentication performance in time-varying environments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the open broadcast nature of radio signal propagation, as well as owing to using
standardized transmission schemes and intermittent communications, wireless communication
systems are extremely vulnerable to interception and spoofing attacks. First of all, the open
broadcast nature of the wireless medium facilitates the reception of radio signals by any illegiti-
mate receiver within the coverage of the transmitter [1]. Secondly, the standardized transmission
and conventional security schemes of wireless networks make interception and eavesdropping
fairly straightforward [2], [3]. Moreover, the “on-off” and sporadic transmissions of low cost
wireless devices, especially the significantly growing number of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices,
provide abundant opportunities to adversaries for spoofing attacks. Therefore, the enhancement
of authentication schemes is of paramount importance for wireless communication systems,
especially in the light of the ongoing convergence between the wireless infrastructure and vertical
industrial applications enabled by IoT.
A. Comparison of Conventional and Physical Authentication Techniques
Although digital key-based cryptographic techniques [4]–[6] have been widely used both for
communication security and authentication, they may fall short of the desired performance in
many emerging scenarios. One fundamental weakness of the digital credentials based on con-
ventional cryptography is that detecting compromised security keys cannot be readily achieved,
since the inherent physical attributes of communication devices and users are disregarded [1].
Given the rapidly growing computational capability of low-cost devices, it is becoming more
and more feasible to crack the security key from the intercepted signals of standardized and
static security protocols. Furthermore, conventional cryptographic techniques also require ap-
propriate key management procedures to generate, distribute, refresh and revoke digital security
keys, which may result in excessive latencies in large-scale networks. Indeed, this latency may
become intolerable for delay-sensitive communications, such as networked control and vehicular
communications. The computational overhead of digital key-based cryptographic methods is
3also particularly undesirable for devices, which have limited battery lifetime and computational
capability, such as IoT sensors.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of conventional and physical authentication techniques.
To overcome these challenges, an alternative approach of authenticating a user (transmitter) is
to exploit the physical layer attributes of communication links. Such analog-domain attributes are
inherently related to the unique imperfection of communicating devices and to the corresponding
environment, which are hard to impersonate and predict. These physical layer attributes include
the channel impulse response (CIR) [7], received signal strength indicator (RSSI) [8], carrier
frequency offset (CFO) [9]–[11], in-phase-quadrature-phase imbalance (IQI) [11], and so on,
which can also be used to generate more unique combinations of these attributes for authenti-
cation. These diverse physical layer attributes and their combinations provide new mechanisms
in a multi-dimensional domain for the enhancement of physical layer authentication. Given its
obvious advantages including low computational requirement, low network overhead and modest
energy consumption, physical layer authentication has been widely studied [12]–[26]. A detailed
4comparison of conventional and physical authentication techniques is given in Fig. 1.
B. Challenges for Physical Layer Authentication
Despite its many advantages, physical layer authentication also faces several major challenges
imposed by the hitherto less well-explored security mechanisms and owing to the analog nature
of the link attributes used, as seen in Fig. 1.
Imperfect estimates and variations of the physical layer attributes are inevitable in practical
wireless networks. These constitute challenges for the physical layer authentication, but benefi-
cially, they provide unique distinguishing features. Having said that, their adequate estimation
often imposes challenges on physical layer authentication, mainly due to time-varying chan-
nels, dynamic interference conditions, mobility of devices, non-symmetrical observations at the
transmitter and receiver, as well as owing to the measurement errors, just to name a few.
To elaborate a little further on the challenges, performance of the single-attribute-based phys-
ical layer authentication schemes [12]–[23] remains limited by the imperfect estimates of the
specific attribute used. Moreover, the limited range of the specific attribute distribution may not
be sufficiently wide-spread for differentiating the devices all the time. These estimations lead
to low-reliability and low-robustness of physical layer authentication in conjunction with only a
single attribute, especially in a hostile time-varying wireless communication environment.
Hence, multiple physical layer attributes may be taken into account for improving the au-
thentication performance [24]–[26], since it is more difficult for an adversary to succeed in
predicting or imitating all the attributes based on the received signal. On the other hand, when the
environment is time-variant, the performance of physical layer authentication could be severely
affected by the unpredicable variations of attributes due to the potential decorrelation of the
physical layer attributes observed at different time instants. Although the variations of attributes
provide additional scope for improving the security mechanisms by increasing the uncertainty
for the adversaries, at the same time also for the legitimate users operating without discovering
and tracking the variations of the attributes.
In a nutshell, the main challenge is that a multiple varying attributes-based authentication
scheme is capable of achieving high security in the presence of adversaries, but this increases
the grade of challenge imposed on the legitimate users as well. More importantly, variations
of the physical layer attributes are typically unknown at the design stage and they are hard
to predict, thus it is very difficult to pre-design a static physical layer authentication scheme.
5Hence the conception of an adaptive physical layer authentication scheme is extremely helpful
for improving the performance of physical layer authentication, which can promptly adapt to
the time-varying environment. However, designing near-instantaneously adaptive physical layer
authentication based on multiple attributes in rapidly time-varying environments is challenging
due to the following reasons:
• C1. Both the computational resources and the time available for estimating the statistical
properties of the physical layer attributes are limited;
• C2. New authentication schemes based on multiple attributes result in a large search-
space, which may lead to both excessive complexity and to non-convex search as well
as optimization problems;
• C3. In practical wireless communication, the typical authentication schemes rely on non-
linear techniques, as exemplified by the binary hypothesis tests of [13]–[15] and by the
generalized likelihood ratio test of [12];
• C4. Timely detection of time-varying physical layer attributes and the adaptation of the
physical layer authentication process require sophisticated near-instantaneously adaptive
processing techniques.
In order to overcome these difficulties, the kernel-based machine learning technique of [27]–
[30] is applied for modeling the authentication problem in this paper. Although the family of
parametric learning methods has become mature in the literature [31]–[35], as exemplified by
the linear regression methods of [31] and the polynomial regression methods of [32], [33], these
parametric techniques usually rely on the assumption of knowing the distribution of samples
(i.e. the estimates of the physical layer attributes) together with the specific form of the training
function (e.g. linear function or polynomial function). When the assumptions related to the
samples’ distribution are correct, these parametric methods are more accurate than the non-
parametric methods. However, once the assumptions concerning the samples’ distribution models
become inaccurate, they have a greater chance of failing. This dramatically limits the employment
of parametric learning methods in practical dynamic wireless environments when they face
challenge C1, since computing accurate distributions for multiple physical layer attributes in a
complex time-varying environment becomes time-consuming.
In contrast to parametric learning methods, the non-parametric methods are not specified a
priori, but are determined from the data available. Hence, the non-parametric methods are more
6suitable for tracking dynamically time-varying environments without requiring any assumptions
concerning the attributes’ statistical distributions. Some examples are constituted by the classic
k-nearest neighbors [36] and the decision tree based solutions [37]. However, these two non-
parametric methods have a limited ability to deal with challenges C2-C4. In detail, it is not easy
to determine the most appropriate k-distance in the k-nearest neighbors method. As the decision
tree method, the perturbation of the collected data (e.g. by noise) will result in quite a different
decision tree, thus leading to quite a different authentication result.
The authors of [38] proposed a physical layer authentication scheme based on the extreme
learning machine concept for improving the spoofing detection accuracy. The extreme machine
learning-based method is basically a 2-layer neural network in which the first layer relies on ran-
dom parameters, while the second layer is trained by relying on the Moore-Penrose generalized
inverse. One of the advantages is its efficiency when compared to the conventional neural network
based method invoking back propagation. However, its efficiency critically depends more on the
training data set available. Furthermore, this scheme assumes that all the multiple physical layer
attributes obey the same statistical distribution functions, such as the Gaussian distributions, thus
their success remains limited in the complex high-dynamic environment considered in this paper.
To overcome these challenges, a promising alternative approach of modeling the authentication
process is to track multiple physical layer attributes based on kernel machine learning. As a ben-
efit, the kernel machine [27]–[30] is capable of reducing the dimensionality of the authentication
problem based on multiple attributes. It models the authentication problem as a linear system
without requiring the knowledge of the attributes’ statistical properties. More importantly, the
variations of the physical layer attributes as well as of the environment may be tracked (learnt)
by the kernel machine learning. All these compelling benefits motivate us to propose a novel
authentication scheme based on the kernel learning as an intelligent process in the face of time-
varying wireless communication scenarios to achieve reliable authentication through discovering
the complex dynamic environment encountered and through tracking the variations of multiple
physical layer attributes.
C. Contributions
In this paper, we develop an adaptive authentication scheme based on an intelligent machine
learning-aided process for discovering the associated time-varying environment, and thus for im-
proving the physical layer authentication performance. Firstly, a multiple physical layer attribute
7fusion model based on the classic kernel machine is designed for modeling the authentication
problem without requiring the knowledge of those attributes’ statistical properties, which cor-
responds to C1 of Section I-B. As for C2 and C3, we cast the authentication problem from
a high-dimensional search space to a single-dimensional space by using the classic Gaussian
kernel, hence the resultant physical layer authentication can be considered as a linear system.
Then an adaptive algorithm is proposed for tracking the variations of the physical layer attributes
to achieve a reliable authentication performance, which is a solution for C4 of Section I-B.
Specifically, the contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We design a kernel machine-based model for determining the authentication attributes without
requiring the knowledge of their statistical properties, and cast the authentication system from
a high-dimensional space to a single-dimensional space. Then the resultant physical layer au-
thentication process can be considered as a linear system, which is easier to train based on the
estimates of the physical layer attributes and on the authentication results observed. As a result
of this transformation, the complexity of our multiple physical layer attribute fusion model can
be dramatically reduced, despite considering a high number of physical layer attributes;
2) The learning (training) objective of the physical layer authentication based on kernel machine
may be formulated as a convex problem. We then propose an intelligent authentication process
based on kernel least-mean-square for tracking the variations of the physical layer attributes to
achieve a reliable authentication performance. By deriving the learning rules for both the system
parameters and for the authentication system, the proposed intelligent authentication process
becomes capable of adapting to time-varying environments. Therefore, a timely detection of the
physical layer attributes and the adjustment of the authentication process can be achieved;
3) Our numerical performance and simulations results demonstrate that a larger number of
physical layer attributes leads to a more pronounced authentication performance improvement
without unduly degrading the convergence and training performance. We also demonstrate the
superiority of our authentication process over its non-adaptive benchmarker.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model used in this
paper is presented. In Section III, we design a multiple physical layer attribute fusion model
based on the kernel machine. An adaptive authentication algorithm is proposed in Section IV,
and both the convergence as well as our authentication performance analysis are presented in
Section IV. The simulation results are discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the
paper.
8II. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 2, we consider a wireless network, where Alice and Bob communicate
with each other in the presence of an eavesdropper, explicitly, Eve, who intends to intercept
and impersonate Alice, and then to send spoofing signals to obtain illegal advantages. Bob’s
main objective is to uniquely and unambiguously identify the transmitter by physical layer
authentication. The basic physical layer authentication aims for supporting this pair of legitimate
devices by a reciprocal wireless link, while the device-dependent features can be used as a unique
security signature.
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Fig. 2. Adversarial system in a wireless network. The transmissions between two legitimate devices (i.e. Alice and Bob) suffer
from the spoofing attacks from an attacker, i.e., Eve. Bob should identify the transmitter by using multiple time-varying and
imperfectly estimated physical layer attributes.
Again, a combination of multiple attributes can be used for improving the authentication
performance, since it is more difficult for Eve to simultaneously infer multiple attributes of a
large search-space from a received signal. Naturally, the various combinations of physical layer
attributes provide a high grade of uncertainty for the adversaries and simultaneously improve
multi-dimensional protection for the legitimate users. Let us denote the number of physical layer
attributes used for authentication by N and the estimates of multiple physical layer attributes
by H = (H1, H2, ..., HN)T, where T represents the transposition of a vector. Again, these
physical layer attributes may include the channel state information (CSI), carrier frequency offset
9(CFO), received signal strength indicator (RSSI), round-trip time (RTT), in-phase-quadrature-
phase imbalance (IQI), and so on. These unique channel and device features offer security
guarantee by physical layer authentication.
Let us continue by stipulating a few important assumptions for the authentication scenario
considered in this paper, as follows:
Assumption 1. The physical signals transmitted between a pair of legitimate devices rapidly
become decorrelated in space, time and frequency. This implies that it is hard for the attacker
to observe and predict the channel state between legitimate devices, if the attacker is at a third
location, which is further than a wavelength away from Alice and Bob;
Assumption 2. Both the wireless channels and the interference are time-varying, the devices
are moving, and hence the wireless environment is dynamically changing. These all lead to
unpredictable variations of the physical layer attributes;
Assumption 3. The estimates of the physical layer attributes are imperfect, because the legiti-
mate devices roaming in different locations also suffer from different interferences, a dynamic
propagation environment, different estimation errors, and so on.
These assumptions characterize a practical scenario, but naturally, it is more difficult for us to
deal with these imperfectly estimated time-varying physical layer attributes.
The physical layer authentication comprises two phases, as described below.
Phase I: Alice broadcasts one or more messages to Bob at time t. From the received signal,
Bob infers an imperfect estimate of the multiple attributes
HIA[t] = (H
I
A1[t], H
I
A2[t], ..., H
I
AN [t])
T, (1)
which are associated with Alice. At the same time, Eve overhears the transmission.
Phase II: either Alice or Eve transmits a message to Bob at time t+τ . Then Bob obtains another
imperfect estimate
HII [t+ τ ] = (HII1 [t+ τ ], H
II
2 [t+ τ ], ..., H
II
N [t+ τ ])
T, (2)
where τ represents the time interval between the two phases.
Bob should compare the estimate HII [t + τ ] to the previous estimate HIA[t]. If these two
estimates are likely to be originated from the same channel realization and the same imperfect
hardware, then the message is deemed to be coming from Alice.
Remark 1. As we mentioned in the assumptions, the physical layer attributes are time-variant
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and imperfectly estimated. The objective of this paper is to propose an intelligent authentication
process relying on these physical layer attributes. The process proposed aims for achieving
reliable and robust authentication through discovering and learning the complex operating envi-
ronment, in the face of limited computational resources (see C1); our new authentication schemes
based on multiple attributes result in a higher-dimensional search space (C2); the authentication
schemes usually rely on nonlinear processing (C3); the prompt detection of the time-varying
physical layer attributes and the ensuing adjustment of the physical layer authentication require
new sophisticated adaptive processing techniques (C4).
Let us now conceive an intelligent adaptive function F(·), which is used for fusing N
independent physical layer attributes. Then the authentication process can be formulated as a
binary hypothesis test relying on a threshold ν > 0
Φ0 : |F(HIA −HII)| ≤ ν;
Φ1 : |F(HIA −HII)| > ν,
(3)
where Φ0 indicates that the signal is from Alice, while Φ1 indicates that it is from Eve. Due to
the variations and imperfect estimates of the physical layer attributes between Alice and Bob, we
may encounter both false alarms and misdetections. Therefore, the parameters in F(·) should
be promptly updated to achieve low false alarm rate and misdetection rate in a time-varying
environment.
III. KERNEL MACHINE-BASED MULTIPLE PHYSICAL LAYER ATTRIBUTE
FUSION
In order to improve the performance of the authentication schemes in time-varying environ-
ments using multiple physical layer attributes, which are imperfectly estimated and time-varying,
we propose a kernel machine-based model for fusing multiple physical layer attributes without
requiring the knowledge of their statical properties in the spirit of C1 of Section I-B. Then, the
dimension of the search-space is reduced from N to 1 with the aid of our kernel machine-based
physical layer attribute fusion model and our authentication problem can be modeled by a linear
system as detailed in this section (corresponding to C2 and C3 of Section I-B). Therefore, the
trade-off between the authentication false alarm and misdetection can be improved.
In the kernel machine based multiple attribute fusion, Bob will obtain an estimate HII [t+ τ ]
of (2) at time t + τ . Then, Bob will compare the estimate HII [t + τ ] to the previous estimate
11
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Fig. 3. Kernel machine-based multiple physical layer attribute fusion.
at time t, namely for HIA[t] of (1). The difference between these two estimates is denoted as
h = (h1, h2, ..., hN)
T, where each hn ∈ [an, bn] is formulated as
hn = H
I
An[t]−HIIn [t+ τ ], n = 1, ..., N, (4)
with N being the number of physical layer attributes used.
Since the different attributes exhibit quite different ranges and have different units, the normal-
ization (see Fig. 3) is required for scaling the attributes having different ranges to the same range
for the ease of analysis and for the design of the kernel machine-based fusion. In the following,
we normalize the attributes having ranges [an, bn], n = 1, ..., N, to [−1, 1] by invoking
h˜n =
2
bn − an (hn −
an + bn
2
), n = 1, ..., N. (5)
It can be observed from (4) and (5) that these two equations are only used for normalizing
the estimates of the attributes to the range of [−1, 1], so that the rather diverse multiple physical
layer attributes can be processed in the same range. In practical systems, we only have to
know the approximate variation ranges of the attributes, which is reasonable because we can
always have a priori knowledge about the communication systems and environments before
designing the authentication system. For example, the CFO variation range was measured to be
[−78.125, 78.125) kHz according to [22], while the RSSI range depends on the pathloss. If an
and bn are excessive, the estimates of attribute n will be scaled to a smaller real range instead of
the nominal range of [−1, 1], for example, to [−0.5, 0.5]. If the real range is not too small, for
example, not hundreds of times smaller than the nominal range of [−1, 1], this kind of scaling
problems can be readily overcome and will not unduly degrade the authentication performance.
We will demonstrate this result and discuss a bit further in Fig. 12 of Section V.
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Let us assume that a set of observations (h˜l, ŷl)Ll=1 ∈ [−1, 1]N ×{0, 1} is given, which is used
for training the authentication process, where h˜l = (h˜1l, h˜2l, ..., h˜Nl)T is the lth estimate after
the normalization, with each element h˜nl defined in (5), and
ŷl =

1 Φ0
0 Φ1
. (6)
As shown in Fig. 3, the normalized estimates h˜l, l = 1, 2, ..., L, are considered as the inputs of
the kernel machine and f(h˜l) represent the outputs of the kernel machine with the corresponding
inputs given by h˜l ∈ [−1, 1]N , l = 1, 2, ..., L. Note that for the legitimate users, the training data
of a legitimate communication session is relatively straightforward to obtain [39].
Our task is then to infer the underlying mapping function ŷl = f(h˜l) from the training data
set (the samples) received (h˜l, ŷl)Ll=1 ∈ [−1, 1]N ×{0, 1}. In other words, the task in this section
is to represent the authentication system ŷl = f(h˜l) and to model the relationship between the
estimates of the multiple attributes and the corresponding authentication results. After this, we
can verify whether a transmitter is that of Alice or of Eve once a new normalized estimate
h = (h1, h2, ..., hN)
T has been obtained. For example, in a continuous authentication session
as defined in [23], once a transmitter accesses the system again, Bob can infer the estimate of
this transmitter’s physical attributes one more time and then determine its normalized estimate
through (5). This normalized estimate may be different from the previous normalized estimates
h˜l, l = 1, 2, ..., L, because of the time-varying environment or channels, which will be treated
as the new normalized estimate of the attributes. The authentication is then carried out by using
the new normalized estimate to improve the security.
Definition 1 [27]: A Mercer kernel is a continuous, symmetric, positive-definite function κ :
[−1, 1]N × [−1, 1]N → R.
The classic Gaussian kernel function of [27]–[30] is adopted, which has an excellent modelling
capability and it is also numerically stable. The Gaussian kernel function is given by
κ(h˜l,h) = exp(
−‖h˜l − h‖2
2σ2
), (7)
where σ is the kernel width. The kernel width σ should be chosen by the users. The popular
methods of selecting a suitable kernel width include the cross-validation, nearest neighbor,
penalizing function and plug-in based methods of [43]. The Gaussian kernel function of (7)
characterizes a similarity between the observed inputs h˜l and the new normalized estimate h.
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The kernel machine projects the N -dimensional input vector h ∈ [−1, 1]N into a potentially
infinite-dimensional feature space H through a mapping ϕ : [−1, 1]N → H. Note that the
transformation from the input space into the feature space is nonlinear, and the dimensionality
of the feature space is high enough. Then the authentication system can be formulated as
f(h) = wTϕ(h), (8)
where w is the weight vector in the feature space H.
Given the Gaussian kernel function of (7), we can obtain a so-called reproducing kernel Hilbert
space defined as follows:
Definition 2 [41]: Consider a Hilbert space H constituted by the functions g : [−1, 1]N → R. It
is called a reproducing kernel Hilbert space if there exists a kernel κ : [−1, 1]N × [−1, 1]N → R
having the following properties:
• κ has the reproducing property
〈g, κ(h˜l, ·)〉 = g(h˜l), for all g ∈ H, (9)
• κ spans H, i.e. H is the completion of a vector space spanned by κ(h˜l, ·) for h˜l ∈ [−1, 1]N .
Therefore, the feature space H spanned by the Gaussian kernel function of (7) is a reproducing
kernel Hilbert space. We now impose the Representer theorem of [41], [42], which is given by:
Representer Theorem [41], [42]: Let Ω : [0,∞) → R be a strictly monotonically increasing
function, U be a nonempty set, c : (U ×R2)L → R⋃{∞} be an arbitrary risk function, and H
be the reproducing kernel Hilbert space associated with a kernel κ(h˜l, ·). Then each minimizer
g ∈ H of the regularized risk function
c{[h˜1, ŷ1, g(h˜1)], ..., [h˜L, ŷL, g(h˜L)]}+ Ω(‖g‖H), (10)
lends itself to a representation of the form
g(·) =
L∑
l=1
αlκ(h˜l, ·). (11)
Therefore, given the Gaussian kernel function of (7), according to the Representer Theorem,
the optimal authentication system expression can be formulated as
f(h) =
L∑
l=1
αlκ(h˜l,h). (12)
An important relationship between (8) and (12) is
κ(h˜l,h) = ϕ(h˜l)
Tϕ(h). (13)
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Remark 2. We can observe from the kernel function of (7) and from the optimal authentication
system expression of (12) that the physical layer attributes are fused without any specific
knowledge of their statical properties, which corresponds to C1 of Section I-B. As for C2, the
search-space is transformed from being N -dimensional to single-dimensional by our multiple
physical layer attribute fusion model.
Remark 3. In practical wireless networks, the authentication systems are usually nonlinear. For
example, the binary hypothesis test of [13]–[15] and the generalized likelihood ratio test of [12]
(see C3 in Section I-B) can be imposed. By contrast, according to the proposed kernel machine-
based physical layer attribute fusion model of (12), the authentication system is formulated as a
linear system, since the expression of (12) relies on the linear weights αl, l = 1, 2, ..., L.
As discussed above, the estimates of the multiple physical layer attributes H are time-variant,
which may lead to a low authentication performance without adaptation. Therefore, in the next
section, we focus our attention on proposing an adaptive algorithm for promptly adjusting the
authentication system and for updating the parameters in (12), i.e. αl, l = 1, 2, ..., L, through
discovering and learning the complex dynamic environment encountered, which is the solution
of C4 in Section I-B.
IV. ADAPTIVE AUTHENTICATION AS AN INTELLIGENT PROCESS
In this section, a learning procedure is proposed for adaptive authentication based on the
kernel least-mean-square for promptly updating the parameters. This authentication process is
based on learning from the observed samples (h˜l, ŷl)Ll=1 ∈ [−1, 1]N × {0, 1}. Explicitly, the
proposed learning procedure can be viewed as an intelligent process of learning the time-varying
environment for updating the system parameters αl, l = 1, 2, ..., L, to achieve reliable and robust
authentication.
A. Adaptive Authentication Algorithm
Given the samples (h˜l, ŷl)Ll=1 ∈ [−1, 1]N × {0, 1} observed, we transform the N -dimensional
input vector h˜l ∈ [−1, 1]N into a kernel Hilbert space H through a mapping ϕ : [−1, 1]N →
H according to (8). Therefore, we obtain a pair of sample sequences {ϕ(h˜1), ϕ(h˜2), ...} and
{ŷ1, ŷ2, ...}. The weight vector w in (8) at iteration l should be updated for minimizing the cost
function as follows
min
w
l∑
k=1
[ŷk −wTϕ(h˜k)]2. (14)
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Remark 4. We can observe from (14) that the learning (training) objective of the adaptive
authentication process is formulated as a convex optimization problem.
Then the learning procedures conceived for updating the weight vector α and the authentication
system of (12) are given by the following theorems:
Theorem 1: The learning rule conceived for updating the weight vector α[l] in our multiple
physical layer attribute fusion model at iteration l can be expressed as
α[l] = µ× (e[1], e[2], ..., e[l])T, (15)
where µ represents a step-size parameter. Furthermore, e[l] is the prediction error computed as
the difference between the desired observation of the transmitter and its prediction relying on
the authentication system parameters α[l − 1], which is expressed as
e[l] = ŷl − f(h˜l)[l − 1], (16)
where we have
f(h˜l)[l − 1] =
l−1∑
i=1
αi[l − 1]κ(h˜i, h˜l). (17)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 2: The learning rule conceived for adjusting the authentication system at iteration l is
given by
f(h)[l] = f(h)[l − 1] + µe[l]κ(h˜l,h). (18)
Proof: See Appendix B.
In conclusion, according Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, our intelligent authentication process
based on the kernel least-mean-square is summarized at a glance in Algorithm 1.
Remark 5. In conclusion, the search space is transformed from being N -dimensional to single-
dimensional (see Remark 2), the authentication is modelled as a linear system (see Remark 3),
and the learning (training) objective of the authentication is formulated as a convex problem (see
Remark 4). Therefore, it dramatically reduces the complexity of our physical layer authentication
technique relying on multiple attributes. We can also observe from Algorithm 1 that there is only
one ‘while’ loop in step 2, so the execution-time is on the order of O(L), which makes Algorithm
1 an attractive solution. In the next subsection, we will discuss the selection of the step-size
parameter µ, which affects the convergence of our authentication process.
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Algorithm 1 Intelligent authentication process
1. Initialization:
f [0] = 0: initial value of authentication system
e[0] = 0: initial value of prediction error
α[0] = 0: initial value of system parameter α
µ: step-size parameter of learning
σ: kernel width
h˜1: initial input, i.e. the normalized estimate of physical layer attributes
C = {h˜1}: initial set of input
ŷ1: initial observation of the transmitter with the corresponding normalized estimate h˜1
2. Iteration:
2.1 while samples (h˜l, ŷl)Ll=1 ∈ [−1, 1]N × {0, 1} available do
2.2 obtain the output of authentication system f [l − 1] at iteration l − 1 via (12);
2.3 calculate the prediction error e[l] via (16);
2.4 update weight vector α[l] through (15);
2.5 adjust the authentication system f [l] via (18);
2.6 update the input set as C = C + {h˜l};
2.7 l = l + 1;
2.8 end
B. Convergence of the Proposed Authentication Process
The step-size parameter directly affects the convergence of our authentication process, since
increasing the step-size of learning will reduce the convergence time but may in fact lead to
divergence. Therefore, the step-size parameter µ should be carefully decided.
Theorem 3: The proposed intelligent authentication process (see Algorithm 1) converges to a
steady-state value, if the step-size parameter of learning µ satisfies
0 < µ <
L∑L
l=1 κ(h˜l, h˜l)
. (19)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Remark 6. Theorem 3 gives the upper bound of the step-size parameter µ in Algorithm 1, so
that the proposed intelligent authentication process converges to a steady state.
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C. Authentication Performance Analysis
Mathematically, the false alarm rate and the misdetection rate can be formulated based on the
hypothesis test of (3), respectively, as
PFA = P (|F(HIA −HII)| > ν | Φ0) (20)
and
PMD = P (|F(HIA −HII)| ≤ ν | Φ1), (21)
where F represents our multiple physical layer attribute fusion model.
According to the proposed authentication system of (12), the false alarm rate and misdetection
rate at instant L can be rewritten, respectively, as
PFA = P (|
L−1∑
l=1
αlκ(h˜l, h˜L)| ≤ ν | Φ0) (22)
and
PMD = P (|1−
L−1∑
l=1
αlκ(h˜l, h˜L)| ≤ ν | Φ1), (23)
where ν ∈ [0, 1).
In the face of the imperfect estimates of time-varying physical layer attributes, we divide them
into two parts: the time-varying part H that is the real value of physical layer attributes, and
part 4H that is the bias of estimated attributes. Then the estimates HIA[l − τl] and HII [l] can
be written, respectively, as
HIA[l − τl] = H
I
A[l − τl] +4HIA[l − τl] (24)
and
HII [l] = H
II
[l] +4HII [l], (25)
where τl is the time interval between Phase I and Phase II of the physical layer authentication at
iteration l. Furthermore, υ(τl) = (υ1l, υ2l, ..., υNl)T represents the variations of part H
I
A during
the time interval τl, which can be expressed as
υ(τl) = H
II
A [l]−H
I
A[l − τl]. (26)
Given the distributions of part 4H of the multiple physical layer attributes, we can calculate
the false alarm rate and misdetection rate of our scheme as the following theorems. Note that
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our intelligent authentication process does not need the knowledge of their statistical properties
in the training process.
Theorem 4: The false alarm rate expression of our intelligent authentication process at iteration
L is given by
PFA = FY1 ∗ FY2 ∗ · · · ∗ FYL−1(ν)− FY1 ∗ FY2 ∗ · · · ∗ FYL−1(−ν), (27)
where Yl = αl exp(−
∑N
i=1(h˜il−h˜Φ0iL )2/2σ2), l = 1, 2, ..., L−1, h˜Φ0iL is shown in (42), F represents
the cumulative distribution function, and ∗ represents the convolution.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Theorem 5: The misdetection rate expression of our intelligent authentication process at iteration
L is expressed as
PMD = FZ1 ∗ FZ2 ∗ · · · ∗ FZL−1(ν + 1)− FZ1 ∗ FZ2 ∗ · · · ∗ FZL−1(1− ν), (28)
where Zl = αl exp(−
∑N
i=1(h˜il − h˜Φ1iL )2/2σ2), l = 1, 2, ..., L− 1, and h˜Φ1iL is shown in (44).
Proof: See Appendix E.
Remark 7. We can observe from Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 that the false alarm rate and
misdetection rate of our intelligent authentication process depend on both the number of physical
layer attributes N and on the variations of the attributes υ. Our intelligent authentication process
tracks the variations of the attributes υ and promptly adjusts the authentication system, so that
a compelling false alarm rate vs. misdetection rate trade-off is achieved.
V. NUMERICAL PERFORMANCE AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to evaluate the performance of our intelligent authentication process, we provide both
numerical and simulation results in this section. Firstly, we implement our authentication process
using some specific physical layer attributes, and characterize the convergence of Algorithm 1.
Then its false alarm rate vs. the misdetection rate trade-off is studied. Finally, we demonstrate
the superiority of our authentication process over its non-adaptive benchmarker.
First of all, three physical layer attributes, namely the carrier frequency offset (CFO), channel
impulse response (CIR), and received signal strength indicator (RSSI) are considered in our
simulations to confirm the viability of our intelligent authentication process. Specifically, a com-
munication system having a measurement center frequency of 2.5 GHz, measurement bandwidth
of 10 MHz, coherence bandwidth of 0.99, normalized time correlation of 0.99 and sampling
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time of 50 ms is considered. The transmitted signal is passed through a randomly generated
12-tap multipath fading channel having an exponential power delay profile. We assume that the
relative velocity between Alice and Bob is around 20 km/h, and the initial distance between
Alice and Bob is 5 m. Then the CFO of an individual transmitter can be approximated as
a zero-mean Gaussian variable [22], [45], and the standard deviation of the CFO variation is
4CFO ≈ 2.35 × 10−7. The CFO estimation range is [−78.125, 78.125) kHz [22]. Furthermore,
according to [12], an autoregressive model of order 1 (AR-1) is used for characterizing the
temporal amplitude fluctuation Ampk[t] of the kth-tap in our multipath fading channel. Therefore,
the variation of the CIR can be modelled by υCIR =
∑12
k=1 Ampk[t] exp(−j4.99pik), and the per-
tone signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is in the channel measurements range of [−12.8, 14.2) dB with a
median value of 6.4 dB, if the transmit power is 10 mW [12]. Finally, according to [40], the RSSI
can be modeled as PL[dB] = 75+36.1 log(d/10), where PL is the path loss, and d represents the
direct transmission distance between the transmitter and Bob. The direct transmission distance
between the transmitter and Bob is assumed to be in the range of [0, 100] m.
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Fig. 4. Training performance of our intelligent authentication process (Algorithm 1) relying on the CFO, CIR and RSSI triplet.
Given 300 samples of the CFO, CIR and RSSI of Alice, i.e. (h˜l, ŷl)300l=1 ∈ [−1, 1]3 × {0, 1},
where ŷl = 1, Fig. 4 shows the training performance of our intelligent authentication process
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(Algorithm 1) relying on the CFO, CIR and RSSI triplet. The step-size parameter of Algorithm
1 is set to µ = 0.1. We can observe from Fig. 4 that the mean square errors E[‖e[l]‖2] of all the
strategies are significantly reduced, as the iteration index increases from 0 to 50. Furthermore,
the mean square error E[‖e[l]‖2] of each strategy reaches its steady-state value after 30 iterations.
We can also observe from Fig. 4 that the CIR estimation performs better than both the CFO
and RSSI estimation in the training performance at the beginning, but its training performance
becomes the worst after 30 iterations. The reason for this trend is that the deviation of CIR
estimation is lower than that of the CFO and RSSI, while its variation of (26) is higher than
that of the CFO and RSSI.
1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 5 0 6 0 7 0 8 0 9 0 1 0 00 . 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 2
0 . 0 0 4
0 . 0 0 6
0 . 0 0 8
0 . 0 1 0
Mea
n Sq
uare
 Err
or
I t e r a t i o n  I n d e x
 C F O  &  C I R C F O  &  R S S I C I R  &  R S S I C F O  &  C I R  &  R S S I
4 0 6 0 8 0 1 0 00 . 0 0 0 0
0 . 0 0 0 1
0 . 0 0 0 2
0 . 0 0 0 3
0 . 0 0 0 4
0 . 0 0 0 5
Fig. 5. Training performance of our intelligent authentication process (Algorithm 1) relying on 2 attributes (i.e. CFO & CIR,
CFO & RSSI, CIR & RSSI) and 3 attributes (i.e. CFO & CIR & RSSI).
Fig. 5 characterizes the training performance of our intelligent authentication process (see
Algorithm 1) relying on multiple attributes. We consider four cases, namely the CFO & CIR,
the CFO & RSSI, the CIR & RSSI, and finally the CFO & CIR & RSSI scenarios. We can
observe from Fig. 5 that our intelligent authentication process relying on the CFO & RSSI pair
has the worst training performance before 25 iterations, while that relying on the CIR & RSSI
pair has the lowest mean square error. The reason for this trend is that the mean square error
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of our intelligent authentication process relying on the CIR is lower than that of the CFO and
RSSI before 25 iterations seen in Fig. 4, which adversely affects the training performance in this
communication scenario. Additionally, the mean square error of our intelligent authentication
process relying on the CFO & RSSI pair is the lowest after 30 iterations, because both the
CFO and RSSI are more reliable than the CIR in the authentication process. Furthermore, it
is also shown in Fig. 5 that the training performance of our intelligent authentication process
relying on the CFO & CIR & RSSI triplet is worse than that of the CFO & RSSI pair after
30 iterations, while it is better than that of the CFO & CIR pair and CIR & RSSI pair. This is
because the training performance of our intelligent authentication process depends on both the
specific attributes and on the number of physical layer attributes.
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Fig. 6. Authentication performance of our intelligent authentication process relying on the CFO, CFO & CIR, CFO & RSSI,
and CFO & CIR & RSSI scenarios. In this case, Eve can intercept and imitate the CFO of Alice.
Fig. 6 considers the case that Eve can intercept and imitate the CFO of Alice, which character-
izes the authentication performance of our intelligent authentication process relying on the CFO,
CFO & CIR, CFO & RSSI, and finally the CFO & CIR & RSSI scenarios. In other words, Eve
intercepts and impersonates the CFO of Alice to obtain unintended advantages from Bob in this
case. We can observe from Fig. 6 that our intelligent authentication process relying on the CFO
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& CIR & RSSI has the best authentication performance, while that only relying on the CFO
performs worst. The reason for this trend is that Bob can better identify the transmitter by using
CIR and RSSI, although Eve imitates the CFO of Alice in the CFO & CIR & RSSI scenario. On
the other hand, Bob suffers from a high misdetection rate in the CFO scenario, since the CFO
of Alice is impersonated by Eve. It is also shown in Fig. 6 that there is a very small difference
between the authentication performance of our intelligent authentication process relying on the
CFO & CIR pair and that of the CFO & RSSI pair; and the authentication performances of
these two attributes scenarios are better than that of a single-attribute scenario (i.e. CFO). This
is because Bob can identify the adversary by using CIR or RSSI in the CFO & CIR or the CFO
& RSSI scenarios. Therefore, the increasing number of physical layer attributes is expected to
lead to a higher authentication performance in our intelligent authentication process.
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Fig. 7. Authentication performance of our intelligent authentication process relying on the CFO & CIR and CFO & CIR &
RSSI scenarios. In this case, Eve can intercept and imitate both the CFO and CIR of Alice.
Fig. 7 considers the scenario when Eve can intercept and impersonate both the CFO and
CIR of Alice. It is observed from Fig. 7 that the authentication performance of our intelligent
authentication process relying on the CFO & CIR & RSSI triplet is better than that of the CFO
& CIR pair. The reason for this trend is that Bob can identify the adversary using the RSSI in
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the CFO & CIR & RSSI scenario, although Eve imitates both the CFO and CIR of Alice. Both
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 confirm that increasing the number of physical layer attributes leads to a better
authentication performance, since it is more difficult for an adversary to succeed in predicting
or imitating all the attributes based on the received signal.
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Fig. 8. Training performance comparison results of our intelligent authentication process with different step-sizes, i.e. µ = 0.05,
µ = 0.1, µ = 0.2, µ = 0.3, and µ = 0.5.
In Fig. 8, we characterize the training performance of our intelligent authentication process
(see Algorithm 1) parameterized by the step-sizes of µ = 0.05, µ = 0.1, µ = 0.2, µ = 0.3, and
µ = 0.5. It can be observed from Fig. 8 that our intelligent authentication process reaches its
steady-state value in all cases. We can also see from Fig. 8 that our intelligent authentication
process having a higher step-size µ converges quicker. In other words, increasing the step-size of
learning in a specific range accelerates the convergence. This augments the convergence analysis
of Section IV-B.
Fig. 9 characterizes the mean square error vs. the iteration index for the step-size parameters
of µ = 0.2 and µ = 2. As discussed before, our authentication process associated with µ = 0.2
converges to a steady-state value, while µ = 2 diverges. This is because µ = 2 is out of the
range specified in Theorem 3. Note that the upper bound of the step-size in this case is 1, which
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Fig. 9. Convergence and divergence of our intelligent authentication process.
can be obtained from (19).
Fig. 10 quantifies the influence of the number of physical layer attributes N on the training
performance, which shows the mean square error E[‖e[l]‖2] vs. the iteration index for different
numbers of physical layer attributes, namely for N = 5, N = 10 and N = 15. The step-size
parameter is set to µ = 0.1. It can be observed that the mean square error E[‖e[l]‖2] tends to
a steady-state value, as the iteration index increases. Moreover, we can also observe from Fig.
10 that a larger number of attributes only leads to a slightly slower convergence. Therefore, the
explosion of computational complexity upon increasing the number of physical layer attributes
can be readily avoided by our intelligent authentication process. This validates our analysis
provided in Section III, and supported by Remark 2, 3, 4.
Fig. 11 characterizes the influence of the number of physical layer attributes N on the
authentication performance, which quantifies the MD rate vs. the threshold of FA rate for different
numbers of physical layer attributes, namely for N = 2, N = 3, N = 4 and N = 5. It can be
observed that the MD rates are reduced in all cases as the threshold δ of FA rate increases from 0
to 0.05, because there is an inevitable FA-and-MD trade-off. One can also observe from Fig. 11
that a larger number of attributes leads to a more obvious security performance improvement,
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Fig. 10. Training performance comparison results of our intelligent authentication process with different numbers of physical
layer attributes, i.e., N = 5, N = 10 and N = 15.
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Fig. 11. Authentication performance comparison results of our intelligent authentication process with different numbers of
physical layer attributes, i.e. N = 2, N = 3, N = 4 and N = 5.
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without substantially degrading the convergence performance (see Fig. 10) of our intelligent
authentication process. This trend demonstrates the validity of our authentication performance
analysis in Section IV-C. In a nutshell, by using more physical layer attributes, our intelligent
authentication process achieves a better authentication performance, indicating the presence of a
FA-and-MD trade-off, because we can readily fuse multiple physical layer attributes and control
the authentication system to track the variations of multiple attributes. On the same note, the
attackers find it more difficult to predict and imitate a larger number of attributes from a received
signal.
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Fig. 12. Authentication performance comparison results of our intelligent authentication process with different real ranges in
the normalization of Fig. 3 and (5), i.e. [−0.1, 0.1], [−0.5, 0.5] and [−1, 1].
Fig. 12 characterizes the false alarm rate vs. the misdetection rate for different real ranges,
namely for [−0.1, 0.1], [−0.5, 0.5] and [−1, 1]. The real range of [−0.1, 0.1] represents the case
that an and bn of (5) are chosen to be ten times larger than the exact range of attribute n in
the normalization of Fig. 3. Therefore, the estimates of attribute n will be scaled to a real range
of [−0.1, 0.1] instead of the nominal range of [−1, 1]. Similarly, the real range of [−0.5, 0.5]
represents the case that we choose [an, bn] twice larger than the exact range of the physical layer
attribute n. We can observe from Fig. 12 that a mismatch only leads to a small authentication
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performance difference, even though we opted for [an, bn] to be ten times larger than the exact
range of physical layer attribute n.
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Fig. 13. Comparison results between our intelligent process and the process without updating system parameters relying on
CFO & CIR & RSSI.
In Fig. 13, let us now impose the variations on the CFO, CIR and RSSI for comparing
our intelligent process and the process operating without updating the system parameters. The
threshold of the false alarm rate is 0.015. Then we can observe from Fig. 13 that upon increasing
the time between updates, the MD rate of our intelligent process remains robust, tending to
2× 10−5, while that of the process operating without updating the system parameters increases
dramatically from about 2 × 10−5 to almost 0.3. This demonstrates that without an adaptive
scheme, the authentication performance will be dramatically reduced in time-varying environ-
ments. Therefore, our intelligent process performs better than the authentication scheme operating
without updating the system parameters.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed an intelligent physical layer authentication technique. A kernel
machine-based model was proposed for combining the multiple physical layer attributes and
for modelling the authentication as a linear system. Through the kernel machine-based multiple
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attribute fusion model, the number of dimensions of the search-space was reduced from N to 1,
and the learning objective was formulated as a convex problem. Therefore, its complexity was
substantially reduced. Then, by conceiving an adaptive authentication process relying on the ker-
nel machine-based multiple attribute fusion model, the process advocated readily accommodated
a time-varying environment by discovering and learning this complex dynamic environment. Both
the convergence performance and the authentication performance of our intelligent authentication
process were theoretically analyzed and numerically validated. The simulation results showed
that the authentication performance can be dramatically improved by increasing the number of
physical layer attributes exploited by our intelligent authentication process without degrading
its convergence performance. It was also demonstrated that it has a much better authentication
performance in a time-varying environment than its non-adaptive counterpart.
APPENDIX A
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let
J(w) =
l∑
k=1
[ŷk −wTϕ(h˜k)]2. (29)
By invoking a step-size parameter µ, the learning rule for the parameterw can be derived by using
the gradient. The partial derivative of the function J(w) with respect to w = (w1, w2, ..., wl)T
is given by
∂J(w)
∂w
= −2
l∑
k=1
ϕ(h˜k)[ŷk −wTϕ(h˜k)], (30)
and the instantaneous gradient at iteration l is
∂J(w)
∂w
[l] = −ϕ(h˜l)[ŷl −w[l − 1]Tϕ(h˜l)]. (31)
According to the steepest descent algorithm, we have
w[l] = w[l − 1] + µϕ(h˜l)[ŷl −w[l − 1]Tϕ(h˜l)]. (32)
Since e[l] of (16) can also be expressed as
e[l] = ŷl −w[l − 1]Tϕ(h˜l), (33)
29
the repeated application of (32) through iterations becomes
w[l] = w[l − 1] + µϕ(h˜l)e[l] = w[l − 2] + µϕ(h˜l−1)e[l − 1] + µϕ(h˜l)e[l]
= · · · =
l∑
i=1
µϕ(h˜i)e[i]; (w[0] = 0), l = 1, 2, ..., L. (34)
According to (8), (12) and (13), we can derive the authentication system as
f(h) =
L∑
l=1
αlκ(h˜l,h) =
L∑
l=1
αlϕ(h˜l)
Tϕ(h) = w[L]Tϕ(h) =
L∑
l=1
µe[l]ϕ(h˜l)
Tϕ(h), (35)
then we have
αl[l] = µe[l]. (36)
Therefore, the parameter vector α at iteration l, i.e., α[l] = (α1[l], α2[l], ..., αl[l])T, can be
updated through (15). 
APPENDIX B
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to Theorem 1, the authentication system at iteration l can be formulated as
f(h)[l] =
l∑
k=1
αkκ(h˜k,h) = µ
l∑
k=1
e[k]κ(h˜k,h) = µ
l−1∑
k=1
e[k]κ(h˜k,h) + µe[l]κ(h˜l,h)
= f(h)[l − 1] + µe[l]κ(h˜l,h). (37)
Therefore, the learning rule proposed for adjusting the authentication system of (12) is expressed
as (18). 
APPENDIX C
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 3
A practical convergence criterion is convergence in the mean square error sense, which is
formulated as
E[‖e[l]‖2]→ constant, as l→∞, (38)
where E[·] represents the expectation of ·. It was shown in [41], [44] that the least-mean-square
criterion based learning is convergent in the mean square, if µ satisfies
0 < µ <
1
βmax
, (39)
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where βmax is the largest eigenvalue of the correlation matrix Θ[L] given by
Θ[L] = [ϕ(h˜1), ϕ(h˜2), ..., ϕ(h˜L)]N×L. (40)
Since βmax < tr(Θ[L])/L, where tr(Θ[L]) is the trace of the matrix Θ[L], we have
0 < µ <
L
tr(Θ[L])
=
L∑L
l=1 κ(h˜l, h˜l)
. (41)
Therefore, the proposed intelligent authentication process (see Algorithm 1) converges to a
steady-state value if the step-size parameter of learning µ satisfies (19). 
APPENDIX D
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 4
According to (5), (24), (25), and (26), we can calculate h˜L = (h˜1L, h˜2L, ..., h˜NL)T in case of
Φ0 as
h˜Φ0iL =
2
bi − ai (υi(τL) +4H
I
Ai[L− τL]−4HIIAi[L]−
ai + bi
2
), (42)
where τL is the time interval between Phase I and Phase II of our physical layer authentication
at iteration L. Given the distributions of 4HIAi and 4HIIAi of each physical layer attribute, the
probability of density function of h˜Φ0iL can be obtained. Let Yl = αl exp(
−∑Ni=1(h˜il−h˜Φ0iL )2
2σ2
), we can
calculate the false alarm rate at iteration L as
PFA = P (|
L−1∑
l=1
αl exp(
−∑Ni=1(h˜il − h˜Φ0iL )2
2σ2
)| ≤ ν) = P (
L−1∑
l=1
Yl ≤ ν)− P (
L−1∑
l=1
Yl < −ν)
= F∑L−1
l=1 Yl
(ν)− F∑L−1
l=1 Yl
(−ν) = FY1 ∗ FY2 ∗ · · · ∗ FYL−1(ν)− FY1 ∗ FY2 ∗ · · · ∗ FYL−1(−ν). (43)
Therefore, the false alarm rate expression of our intelligent authentication process at iteration L
is shown in (27). 
APPENDIX E
THE PROOF OF THEOREM 5
According to (5), (24), and (25), h˜L = (h˜1L, h˜2L, ..., h˜NL)T in case Φ1 is formulated as
h˜Φ1iL =
2
bi − ai (H
I
Ai[L− τL]−HIIEi[L] +4HIAi[L− τL]−4HIIEi[L]−
ai + bi
2
). (44)
31
Given the distributions of 4HIAi and 4HIIEi of each physical layer attribute, the probability
of density function of h˜Φ1iL can be obtained. Upon letting Zl = αl exp(
−∑Ni=1(h˜il−h˜Φ1iL )2
2σ2
), the
misdetection rate at iteration L yields
PMD = P (|1−
L−1∑
l=1
αl exp(
−∑Ni=1(h˜il − h˜Φ1iL )2
2σ2
)| ≤ ν)
= P (
L−1∑
l=1
Zl ≤ ν + 1)− P (
L−1∑
l=1
Zl < 1− ν)
= FZ1 ∗ FZ2 ∗ · · · ∗ FZL−1(ν + 1)− FZ1 ∗ FZ2 ∗ · · · ∗ FZL−1(1− ν). (45)
Therefore, the misdetection rate expression of our intelligent authentication process at iteration
L is given by (28). 
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